Abstract-Market power assessment is a prime concern when designing a deregulated electricity market. In this paper, we propose a new functional market power measure, termed transmission constrained network flow (TCNF), that unifies three large classes of transmission constrained structural market power indices in the literature: residual supply based, network flow based, and minimal generation based. Furthermore, it is suitable for demand-response and renewable integration and hence more amenable to identifying market power in the future smart grid. The measure is defined abstractly, and allows incorporation of power flow equations in multiple ways; we investigate the current market operations using a DC approximation and further explore the possibility of including detailed AC power flow models through semidefinite relaxation, and interior-point algorithms from Matpower. Finally, we provide extensive simulations on IEEE benchmark systems and highlight the complex interaction of engineering constraints with market power assessment.
A Unifying Market Power Measure for Deregulated
Transmission-Constrained Electricity Markets
I. INTRODUCTION

B
EGINNING in 1990 with Chile, electricity markets in many regions have moved from being a vertically integrated regulated monopoly to a deregulated market structure to encourage innovation and competition in technology. The California energy crisis in 2000-2001, however, highlights how strategic interaction can erode the benefits of competition in a deregulated market. It is estimated that about $5.55 billion was paid in excess of costs in the deregulated market in California between 1998 and 2001 alone [1] . Market monitoring S. Bose is with the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853 USA (e-mail: sb2333@cornell.edu).
C. Wu is with the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA 15213 USA (e-mail: wucy@cmu.edu).
Y. Xu is with the Engineering Systems and Design Pillar, Singapore University of Technology and Design, Singapore (e-mail: yunjian_xu@sutd.edu.sg).
A. Wierman is with the Department of Computing and Mathematical Sciences at California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA 91125 USA (e-mail: adamw@caltech.edu).
H. Mohsenian-Rad is with the Department of Electrical Engineering, University of California, Riverside, CA 92521 USA (e-mail: hamed@ee.ucr.edu).
Color versions of one or more of the figures in this paper are available online at http://ieeexplore.ieee.org.
Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/TPWRS.2014.2360216
and market power mitigation measures are essential to avoid such over-payments. It is expected to become even more critical as new smart grid technologies such as intermittent renewable generation, energy storage, and demand-response programs start presenting more opportunities to exploit. The Department of Justice defines market power as the ability of a firm to profitably alter prices away from competitive levels [2] , [3] . In other words, market power is a form of market "dominance", where a player can increase its profitability by behaving independently of competitors and consumers. Market power in generic markets has been extensively studied using microeconomics, e.g., in [4] . The theory, however, does not apply directly to electricity markets due to various reasons, such as: 1) Unlike in most commodity markets, electricity cannot be stored cheaply; therefore generators have significant short-run capacity constraints. 2) Electricity demand is typically inelastic because of limited price-responsiveness of consumers. 3) Trade agreement between a supplier and a consumer is not enough to guarantee feasible power delivery over a transmission grid since power transfer respects physical laws as well as market outcomes. Economics or engineering alone cannot handle such issues adequately. In electricity markets, such dominance can be global, e.g., by a supplier with a large enough generation capacity, or local, e.g., by a supplier in a region which has limited ability to import less expensive electricity due to transmission constraints [5] .
A. Literature on Market Power
Classically, the literature on market power is fractured. Recently, however, a principled design has begun to emerge, e.g., see [3] for a survey. The analysis of market power can be divided into three distinct categories: 1) structural analysis, 2) competition models, and 3) behavioral analysis.
Structural analysis of market power is based on an ex ante approach where the emphasis is on identifying firms that own "must-run" generators and hence have a strategic advantage in terms of market share, location in the network, etc. Such market power studies are also useful in the long-run to evaluate mergers, plan transmission capacity expansions, etc. Competition models analyze the electricity market either as a supply function or a Cournot competition with or without transmission constraints and establish competitive benchmarks for firm behavior using extensive simulations, e.g., see [6] - [9] . Real data is then compared ex post to such benchmarks to identify abuses of market power. In contrast, behavioral analysis is another ex post approach that detects actual supply withholding or high price-to-cost markups in the spot market as opposed to comparing it with perfectly competitive behavior. We make two observations. First, ex post analysis with real data can be highly challenging to identify intentional abuse of market power [10] , [11] . Second, when such studies are possible, ex post analysis correlates with structural indices [12] , [13] . Thus, ex ante structural analysis helps to prevent rather than cure the abuse. In this paper, we focus on structural analysis.
Early work on structural market power analysis, emerging from microeconomics, suggested measures that focussed exclusively on market share based on generator capacities, e.g., Herfindahl-Hirschmann index (HHI) [14] . The major shortcoming of such an analysis in electricity markets is in defining the relevant market. Due to demand variations and lack of storage, electricity across different periods of time are not substitutes. Similarly supplies that are geographically located on different ends of a congested transmission line are not substitutes. Thus, market power indices that are agnostic to demand variations and transmission constraints have limited applicability to electricity markets.
To incorporate the demand side, Bushnell et al. introduced the pivotal supplier index (PSI) as a binary indicator examining whether the capacity of a generator is larger than the supply surplus, i.e., the difference between the total supply and the total demand [15] . Later, Sheffrin et al. refined PSI by measuring market power on a continuous scale, and proposed the residual supply index (RSI) in [16] . This index is used by the California ISO to assure price competitiveness [17] . The electric reliability council of Texas (ERCOT) uses a similar measure called the element competitiveness index (ECI) [18] , based on HHI [14] .
Issues arising due to transmission constraints have also been addressed in the literature. A traditional approach uses the SSNIP (small but significant non-transitory increase in price) test [19] to identify geographically isolated "load pockets". Many authors have studied Cournot-based or supply-function based markets with congestion, e.g., see [6] - [9] , [20] , and [21] . Structural indices on a transmission constrained network, however, have remained fractured. We have attempted to bridge that gap.
B. Contributions of This Paper
In this work, we introduce a functional market power measure that unifies the theory for structural analysis. Then, we study the complex interactions of this measure with the engineering constraints. 1 The new measure, termed "transmission constrained network flow" unifies three broad classes of structural measures in the literature: "network flow based" [23] , [24] , "residual supply based" [20] , [25] , and "minimal generation based" [26] , [27] . We introduce each of these classes in detail in Section II. Then in Section III, we formulate our measure. Calculating it requires us to solve a nonconvex optimization program resulting from the nature of the AC power flow equations. Current electricity markets use a linearized DC approximation [28] , [29] . Employing this approximation, we solve a linear program (LP) to compute the market power functional 1 A preliminary version of this work has appeared in [22] . and study its properties in detail. We further explore the possibility of including a detailed AC power flow model in this economic measure in Section IV in two ways: 1) use interior-point based methods implemented in Matpower [30] , 2) use recent advances in semidefinite programming (SDP) based relaxations [31] to AC power flow equations [32] - [35] . In Section V, we provide extensive simulations on IEEE benchmark systems [30] and illustrate the impact of modeling engineering constraints in identifying market power. We generalize our measure to the case where firms can own generators at multiple locations in Section VI.
II. MARKET POWER MEASURES
Recently, many indices have been introduced to include the effects of transmission constraints in structural market power indices; we categorize them as: "residual supply based", "network flow based", and "minimal generation based". In what follows, we introduce each of them in detail.
A. Residual Supply Based Measures
Residual supply based measures propose to quantify the maximum total load that the transmission-constrained electricity market can meet if generator of interest, , is excluded. Following [20] and [25] , the transmission-constrained residual supply index (TCRSI) for generator is defined as (1) where is the supply vector, is the demand scaling parameter, is the generation shift factor matrix, is load shift factor matrix, is the transmission line capacity vector, is the capacity of generator is the demand of load is a unit vector, and denotes transposition. If , then generator can potentially exercise market power. Consider the network in Fig. 1 . For , TCRSI is 3.2/7, the fraction of demand that can be met with available supply.
B. Network Flow Based Measures
Network flow based measures are exemplified by [23] and [24] , which model market power in the presence of transmission constraints in terms of the maximal network flow (MNF) achievable without the generator of interest. Conceptually, these measures are similar to TCRSI, but they do not use power flow equations to model the underlying power systems. A key result in [23] and [24] is that market power is supermodular, i.e., there is always an incentive for generators to collude. This conclusion, however, does not hold if the power flows respect Kirchoff's laws. See Section VI for an example in IEEE test systems. We illustrate this through a simple example here. Consider the network in Fig. 1 . When withholds generation, can only supply 3.2 pu; demand shortfall is 3.8 pu. Similarly, when withholds generation, demand shortfall is 4.33 pu. When both generators withhold, shortfall is the total demand of 7 pu, which is lower than the sum of the two shortfalls computed before. Thus market power is not supermodular. Intuitively, one would expect that there is always an incentive to collude since any individual strategy for generators would likely be a valid strategy for a collusion of generators. Market power index, however, measures the demand shortfall due to the absence of a generator. Roughly, when power injection from two different generators lead to opposing power flows on a capacity-limited transmission line, then these two generators acting together may not be able to cause more demand shortfall than shortfalls due to each generator withholding alone. This intuition indeed holds for the network in Fig. 1 .
C. Minimal Generation Based Measures
The above two definitions of market power focus on the fraction of unmet demand when generator at bus is not in service. An alternate approach is to calculate the minimum generation required from generator to meet the total target demand. In particular, minimal generation based measures typically identify "must run generators", e.g., [26] , [27] are exemplified by the transmission-constrained minimal generator index (TCMGI): (2) Note that in (1), we have and the total load is scaled by a variable factor . In (2), however, the output of generator is a variable and the total demand is a constant. If , then generator can exercise market power. In general,
does not equal the unmet demand in the network when generator at bus is not operational. For example, consider the network in Fig. 1 . It can be checked that pu while the shortfall is actually 3.8 pu when the same generator is not in service.
and are indeed related; we explore this below.
III. FUNCTIONAL MEASURE OF MARKET POWER
Prior work on structural market power measures in Section II suggests that while a wide variety of measures exist, the literature lacks a unified theory that incorporates economic and engineering constraints. Here, we propose a functional market power measure rather than a market power index that represents a step toward such a unifying measure.
To motivate the measure, consider the following informal definition:
The functional maps every scalar into the maximum demand that can be satisfied when the (real) power output of generator is no more than .
can also be interpreted as a measure of the minimum amount of load that has to be shed (or dispatched, through demand-side management 2 ), provided that the supply of generator is up to . At different levels of , it measures the relative importance of each generator to meet additional demand, abiding by the network constraints.
The definition can also be interpreted as follows. Consider the optimal power flow (OPF) problem where the objective is to only satisfy demand and the production level of generator is bounded above by the parameter . Then, the optimal objective value of this OPF type problem is a function of that variable and hence defines a "functional" measure of market power for generator .
In the rest of this section, we provide a detailed power flow model and its linearized approximation. This allows us to obtain a unifying market power measure that is applicable to the current electricity markets and can be adapted for the evolving smart grid. Then, we formally define with the engineering constraints.
A. Definition
We begin with some notation. Let and for any complex matrix or number , let be the complex conjugate transpose of . Consider a network on nodes (buses) labeled . Let and be the real and reactive power generations at node . Also let and be the real and reactive power demands that are met at node . We denote by , the apparent power flowing from bus to bus , where and are the real and reactive power flows, respectively. Thus, power balance equation at each node is given by (3) where denotes that buses and are connected in the power network. We assume that the power generations satisfy (4) where is a constant that depends on the generation technology. Essentially, each generator is assumed to vary its reactive power output within a certain power factor of the real power generation. The total load to be supported at bus has a target real demand and a target power factor . The target power factor depends on the type of load at bus . Thus, the supported demand satisfies
Power factors typically range from 0.95 to 0.98 lagging. The apparent power flowing from bus to bus is and is bounded by the thermal and stability limits of the transmission lines as (6) where is the known capacity of the line between buses and . Let the voltage at bus be , and the admittance of the line between buses and be . The current flowing from bus to bus is and we have
To maintain power quality and system stability, the voltage magnitude at bus satisfies (8) where and are known constants. Using the notation introduced above, we are now ready to formally introduce our market power measure. For a generator at node , define (9) We refer to this measure as the transmission-constrained network flow. The constraints in (3)- (8) model the impact of the network topology, the underlying circuits, and the transmission line capacities. These constraints make our analysis different from a traditional economic approach to market power. Note that, is a functional measure, i.e., it evaluates market power for every given value of parameter . In Section III-C, we describe how the measure in (9) unifies the three general classes of structural market power measures discussed in Section II.
The formulation of the TCNF measure in (9) is general. Depending on how the nonconvexity in the power flow equations is tackled, different variations of the TCNF measure can be derived. We focus on the most practical version, which is based on the linearized DC approximation, since current electricity markets widely employ this to model the underlying power system. In the rest of this section, we describe this approximation and analyze the resulting TCNF measure in detail. To highlight the generality of the TCNF framework, we also discuss other variations of the measure in Section IV.
B. DC Approximation
Currently, most electricity markets use a linearized DC approximation of the power flow equations. Therefore, the immediate application of our proposed functional market power measure is in customizing it based on DC approximation, using the following common assumptions [28] , [29] :
• Voltage magnitude at each node is assumed to be at its nominal value, where . Thus, pu.
• Transmission lines are assumed to be loss-less and hence, is purely imaginary for all pairs .
• For any pair of buses , the voltage phase angle differences are assumed to be small, i.e., and . Using this approximation, for any pair , we have
It can be checked that there is no reactive power flow in this model and hence we ignore the reactive power demand constraint in (5) . One can check that this definition of coincides with the one studied in [22] . The measure can be solved as an LP. Henceforth, we refer to this computation as the DC case, denoted by .
C. Properties of
Earlier, we introduced the functional measure and its DC approximated version to assess market power. Now, we explore its salient features. First, when indicates the maximal network flow satisfying the DC power flow constraints with the generator withholding the generation. Thus, generalizes network flow based and residual supply based measures.
To relate to the minimum generation based measure, consider the transmission-constrained minimal generation for generator to be defined as follows:
This generalizes the minimum generation based measures in [23] and [24] to a functional form. It is easy to extend the definition of to its DC approximated version . In the next result, we explore the relationship of the functions and ; proof is included in the Appendix.
Theorem 1: For each generator is a continuous, concave, piecewise linear and non-decreasing function; is a continuous, convex, piecewise linear and non-decreasing function. Moreover, and are inverses of each other, i.e., for any The inverse relationship between and holds for all . Here, is the total demand in the network that can be met, when generator does not withhold any generation and its output satisfies in (4) . Beyond that, the network cannot satisfy the target demand. Then, it is easy to see that only exists for . Next, we illustrate the result of Theorem 1 through an example. Consider the network shown in Fig. 1 . is plotted for generators at buses 1 and 2 in Fig. 2 . Functions and are continuous, convex, piecewise linear and non-decreasing. As noted earlier, equals the TCRSI for generator . Also, TCMGI for generator is given by . TCRSI and TCMGI for each generator are indicated in the figure.
Lower the value of , higher the market power of generator . Thus, we plot by considering the lower envelope of and to indicate the market power of the dominant generator for each . In this example, the generator with maximum market power changes with . This suggests that market power assessment is complex and cannot be sufficiently captured through a single index.
D. Calculating
Computing the DC approximated market power functional requires solving a linear program that is fast and scalable with the size of the network. From Theorem 1, we know that is continuous and piecewise linear. Then we can characterize the slopes of the linear segments of using Lagrangian duality [31] . Furthermore, we can use these slopes to provide an efficient way to compute the function. Specifically, for generator , let be the Lagrange multiplier for the constraint . For any function in variable , define as its right-hand derivative. We can relate the slopes of the linear segments of the function as follows: (10) where is the Lagrange multiplier at the optimum. Since is non-differentiable only at the end-points of each line segment, the right-hand derivative in (10) is well-defined. Using (10), a recursive algorithm can be developed to compute for in any interval efficiently; see [22] for details.
IV. AC POWER FLOW AND MARKET POWER
While the DC approximation results in a variation of TCNF that best fits the current practices in electricity markets, we explore the possibility of including a detailed AC power flow model in market power assessment in this section. To motivate this generalization, notice that structural indices identify pivotal suppliers or generators that are crucial to meet demand subject to engineering constraints. These constraints, however, are not limited to transmission capacities alone, but also includes limits on voltage magnitudes and reactive powers. Though remains our main focus, this section serves to explore the impact of the underlying engineering model on the economics of electricity markets. It also shows that our market power functional easily generalizes with different models of power flow equations.
Recall that the calculation of involves the solution of a nonconvex optimization problem in (9) . The role of nonconvexity of power-flow equations have played a significant role in the literature on power networks [36] . Traditionally, the engineering problems and market computations have differed in the approaches taken to deal with this nonconvexity. While market outcomes have relied on the DC approximation [15] , [16] , [18] , [22] , [23] , [25] , engineering applications such as real-time economic dispatch have applied heuristics or iterative techniques to reach an implementable operating point [30] , [37] . The conic relaxation approach is a recent development that is finding applications in both the engineering and market considerations, e.g., see [32] , [33] , and [35] for its use in optimal power flow and see [38] and [39] for its use in electricity markets. In what follows, we present two computational approaches to assess market power with AC power flow equations: 1) using heuristic iterative nonconvex optimization techniques in Section IV-A, 2) relaxing the nonconvex quadratic equality (7) to a convex semidefinite constraint and use conic program solvers in Section IV-B. Our goal is to explicitly characterize the effect of the engineering models of the power system on market considerations.
A. Nonlinear Optimization Technique
Many iterative techniques have been used to solve optimization problems in power systems, specifically the optimal power flow problem. See [36] and [37] for surveys. Some notable examples are quadratic programming, variations of gradient methods, Newton-based techniques, sequential quadratic programming, and interior-point based methods. In this work, we use the primal-dual interior-point solver in Matpower [30] . When this converges, we refer to it as and call this computation as the NL case. Interior-point methods were popularized by Karmarkar for LPs [40] and Nesterov et al. for SDPs [41] . For LPs and SDPs, it is known that interior point methods converge to a global optimal solution in polynomial time. For nonlinear nonconvex problems, they rather provide a heuristic approach to obtain a local optimal solution.
Matpower has been known to perform well for economic dispatch problems over various IEEE test systems. As we would show in Section V, the NL case often shows similarity to the DC and the AC cases. It provides a yard stick to measure the performance of our proposed DC approximation and the AC relaxation approaches. However, we reiterate that computing TCNF in (9) is NP-hard and thus it is hard to comment on the optimality of the solution obtained using Matpower.
B. SDP Relaxation Approach
Recently, a conic relaxation has been proposed to deal with the nonconvexity of power-flow equation in (7), e.g., see [32] - [35] . In particular, consider the positive semidefinite matrix that has rank one (denoted as ). For each pair of buses , we express as a linear matrix equality in as follows. Define an matrix , where and the rest of the entries of are zero. In terms of , the equality in (7) can be written as Accordingly, the optimization problem to calculate TCNF becomes a rank-constrained SDP [31] in terms of the matrix . It still remains nonconvex due to the rank constraint. We relax this rank constraint to obtain and refer to this computation as the AC case.
When the relaxation is exact, it indeed provides a global optimal solution as opposed to the heuristic NL case. However, sufficient conditions for the relaxation to be exact are specific to particular network topologies and constraint patterns [33] , [34] . When line-flow constraints are active, studies in [42] have shown that the relaxation is often inexact and the optimization yields a non rank-1 optimal . To better understand the accuracy of the relaxation in computing , we explore the quantity , where are the first and second eigenvalues, respectively, of the positive semidefinite matrix at optimum. A lower value for this ratio indicates a smaller optimality gap and hence more accurate results. We report the statistics of the quantity on IEEE benchmark systems in Section V. We briefly remark that the SDP relaxation is known to scale poorly with the size of the network. Recent results in [35] and [43] suggest that the sparsity of the power network can be suitably exploited to obtain fast and scalable conic relaxations.
C. Properties of and
In Section III-C, we explored the property of the market power functional . Here, we present a result similar to that of Theorem 1. For the minimum generation based measure, consider the versions of computed using non-linear heuristic techniques of Section IV.A as and through the SDP relaxation of Section IV-B as . First, we relate and as follows. Theorem 2: For each generator is a continuous, concave, and non-decreasing function; is a continuous, convex, and non-decreasing function. Moreover, and are inverses of each other, i.e., for any
The proof is similar to that of Theorem 1 and is omitted for brevity. From Theorems 1 and 2, it follows that the function satisfies all properties of . In addition, it is also piecewise linear as the optimization problem to compute is a linear-parametric LP. This property does not generalize to linear-parametric SDPs; see [31] for a counterexample. The concavity and monotonicity follow from standard arguments on the feasible sets of the respective optimization programs. We briefly remark on the NL case. Unlike the DC and the AC approximations, may not be concave since the local minimum over the nonconvex feasible set of the corresponding optimization problem may not be concave. Also, may not be monotonically increasing in the interval and thus, may not be invertible either.
V. CASE STUDIES
In this section, we use our proposed measure to assess market power of generators in various IEEE test systems [30] . In particular, we show how the market power functional can be affected by different factors such as the variation of target demand due to distributed renewable generation, changes in dispatchable load in presence of demand-response programs, etc. To investigate the significance of engineering constraints on market outcomes, we further compare these results with and . We also study the role of nonconvexity of power flow equations and uncertainty of load power factors in assessing market power.
In our simulations, we consider the IEEE 6-bus and 39-bus test systems. In each case, we look at a variety of scalings of the target demands in the test systems to understand the impact of demand fluctuation and distributed renewable generation. Specifically, target demands are scaled uniformly by a scalar . In other words, each target demand in the database is multiplied by a factor to obtain the new target demand for our simulations. We assume that for all generators, the minimum level of generation is zero, i.e.,
. Most systems have a reactive generation capability defined by . We modify this box constraint on to as in (4), where is chosen accordingly for each case study. To compute and , we use the convex programming package CVX [44] in MATLAB with SDPT3 as the SDP solver [45] . Finally, is computed using the primal-dual interior-point method in Matpower [30] .
A. IEEE 6-Bus Test System
The IEEE 6-bus test system has three generators at nodes 1, 2, and 3. For all generators, we assume that and for all loads we assume that the power-factors are lagging. In Fig. 3, we plot , and for demand scalings of and . For the DC case at , consider the total demand level (y-axis) of 3.2 pu, which is lower than the total target demand level. At this demand level, has a larger slope than . Therefore, to satisfy an extra unit of demand at 3.2 pu, generator 1 has to supply less additional power and hence more valuable to the system operator. This means that generator 1 has more market power in an incremental market.
Notice that there is a remarkable difference between the AC and the DC cases, while the results from the NL case are similar to that of the AC case. Therefore, in this case study, the SDP relaxation finds a solution that is close to an optimal solution of the nonconvex optimization problem in (9) . The TCNF functions for the DC and AC cases in Fig. 3 are increasing and concave for all generators, as delineated in Theorems 1 and 2. This property does not generalize to the NL case. For generator 3, the optimization problem for calculating remains infeasible for pu. This indicates that generator 3 is needed to supply at least 0.35 pu in order to maintain system stability. When the SDP relaxation is infeasible, so is the nonconvex optimization problem in (9) . It is interesting that the interior-point method does not converge to a feasible point for pu either. As we said before, and are quite similar; the only point of difference happens for generators 1 and 2 at , where is greater than . For such a nonconvex optimization problem, determining feasibility is NP-hard and hence it is hard to comment whether this difference is due to infeasibility of (9) at . The SDP relaxation , however, is feasible. Moreover, it is continuous at , as expected from Theorem 2. Another key observation is about the importance of each generator at various demand levels, in presence of dispatchable load. At the same demand level, in Fig. 3 (a) and in Fig. 3(c) give conflicting conclusions as to where dispatchable loads are more valuable, while in Fig. 3(b) agrees with , indicating that the relaxation approach of AC power flow model is efficient in quantifying market power in the IEEE 6-bus system.
Finally, we conduct a numerical analysis to assess the sensitivity of our proposed market power measure to uncertainty in nodal reactive power values. Consider in Fig. 4(a) for generator 2 and in Fig. 4(b) for generator 3 , respectively. The plots have been generated with and and the load power factors have been varied from 0.95 to 0.99 lagging uniformly for all buses in each case. We make two important observations. First, changing the power factor does have impact on market power analysis. Varying the power factors changes the plots in the figures. Second, there is no crossing among the TCNF curves in this figure, which means, minor changes in the power factor-e.g., due to uncertainty in measuring nodal reactive power-do not change our conclusions with respect to identifying the generators with highest potential to gain market power. Therefore, while using an AC power flow model may help in better assessing market power due to its inherently more accurate representation of the underlying physical power system, it is not necessarily prone to higher errors due to uncertainty in both active and reactive power measurements. Of course, whether one prefers to use or may depend on several factors, such as availability of computational power and existing market practices. Such considerations are beyond the scope of this paper.
B. IEEE 39-Bus Test System
We now assess our proposed approach for market power analysis in a larger IEEE test system with 39 buses. Before we present our results, we comment on the role of dispatchable or curtailable loads in market power assessment. The higher the amount of dispatchable load at a bus, the better the grid operator can handle the withholding of a generator at that bus, thus preventing such generator from gaining market power. However, the effectiveness of the same amount of dispatchable load in mitigating market power may not be the same at different buses. In other words, dispatchable load can be more (or less) valuable at certain locations. We explain this through our simulation results on the 39-bus system in Fig. 5 . Consider for generators at buses 31, 35 and 38. For the purpose of our analysis, we plot the lower envelope of only, i.e., for demand levels ranging from to . For the case where , increasing the dispatchable load capacity is most beneficial when it is done at bus 38 because the generator at bus 38 has the highest potential to gain market power in this case. Consider another example. When , if there is 1 pu of dispatchable load capacity already in place in all generator buses, then increasing this capacity is most beneficial at bus 31. If there is 3 pu of dispatchable load capacity already in place in all generator buses, then increasing it at bus 35 is most beneficial. Our market power measure is well suited to characterize benefits of dispatchable loads.
We can also make the following observations from Fig. 5 : 1) In the DC case, depending on the value of , different generators gain maximum market power. In the AC case, it is only generator 38 that always maintains the maximum market power for all values of . 2) The DC and the NL cases are more similar to each other than the corresponding AC case. 3) For demand scaling of , the DC and NL cases indicate that the total demand that can be met is lower than the total target demand. In the AC case, however, the total target demand of about 71.1 pu is satisfied.
C. Summary of Findings
We end our case studies by summarizing some of the highlights of our case studies on IEEE benchmark systems. First, our proposed measure is suitable to incorporate the impact of demand-response in market power analysis. One option is to analyze demand response by looking at the results at a certain demand level, as we explained in Section V-A. Another option is to analyze demand response in the form of quantifying the value of dispatchable loads at different buses, as we explained in Section V-B. Note that, since we study structural market power, our analysis does not involve pricing. Accordingly, it does not address price-elasticity in load demand. However, our case study in Section V-B provides an example on how one can utilize dispatchable loads as an elastic demand resource to mitigate market power.
Second, our proposed measure can be used to understand the role of renewable generation. For example, similar to the analysis in Section V-B, we can assess renewable generators by examining their impact on parameter . Note that, at a bus where a traditional generator is co-located with a renewable generator, the value of is calculated as the total power injection by both generators combined. Therefore, we can analyze how the variations in the output of renewable generator may aggravate or mitigate market power of a co-located conventional generator.
Finally, our proposed market power functional can easily accommodate different power flow models. Though our focus is on the DC model, our case studies also highlight that the AC power flow equations provide valuable insights into identifying reliability must-run generators that are not otherwise obvious from a DC model. Though uncertainties in reactive power loads can affect the TCNF curves of the generators, the variations tend to be much smaller as compared to the DC case. This suggests that faithfully representing the engineering model significantly affects market considerations.
We end this section with a remark on the accuracy of the SDP relaxations in the computation of for IEEE benchmark systems. Recall that the quantity is a measure of accuracy of the relaxation, where are the first and second eigenvalues of the optimal positive semidefinite matrix , respectively. A lower value corresponds to a smaller optimality gap. We tabulate for our simulation runs on IEEE benchmark systems in Table I . We see that is typically very small, but may not be negligible. Such optimality gaps may not be accurate to find optimal operating points in economic dispatch, but as far as structural market power analysis is concerned, the results provide valuable insights to the market monitor on the complex interaction of power flow equations with market power assessment.
VI. FIRM BEHAVIOR
Our focus so far has been on identifying market power of a single generator. The analysis can easily be generalized to the case where a single firm owns multiple generators at different locations. Let denote the set of locations (buses) where the firm has a generator. The TCNF index of the firm can be defined using the optimization problem (9) with a modified constraint that the total supply of the firm's generators does not exceed , i.e.,
. Similarly, the TCMG index of a firm can be defined as the minimum total supply needed from the generators of this firm to meet a certain demand level . This index can be calculated by modifying the objective function to in the definition of . Note that, if an "adversarial" firm acts strategically to degrade the performance of the grid, then the behavior of each individual generator (of the firm) might be potentially different if it acted as a separate entity. A game theoretic analysis will be needed to measure the "worst-case" market power of an adversarial firm. This is an area left for future work.
We end this discussion with a note on supermodularity of market power. When market power is supermodular, it suggests that there is an incentive for generators to collude and form large firms. In fact, previous work in [23] and [24] has suggested that there is always such an incentive. However, [23] and [24] did not use power-flow equations in their study, and so we revisit this question here. Interestingly, it is indeed the case that, most of the time, market power is supermodular. This is not always the case though, e.g., for the IEEE 39-bus system, supermodularity does not hold for for generators at nodes and when the line-flow limits are uniformly scaled down to 70% of their given values. Other examples can also be found. While it is often the case that firms have incentive to collude, this is not universally true.
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we propose a functional market power measure for structural analysis, called the transmission constrained network flow. This measure unifies three directions within market power research-residual supply based measures, network flow based measures, and minimal generation based measures. The measure is useful to study market power with demand response and renewable generation and hence suitable to the needs of the evolving smart grid. Furthermore, it generalizes to the case where firms own multiple generators across the network and can be extended to study possible mergers among generators. Motivated by current market practices, we focus our analysis on the market power functional with a linearized DC approximation of the power flow equations. However, to highlight the generalized market power framework, we also explore the possibility of incorporating the detailed AC power flow equations in our measure. Extensive simulations on IEEE benchmark systems suggest that conclusions can vary significantly depending on the power flow model considered. This points towards the growing need of faithfully representing the physics of the underlying power system in the design and analysis of electricity markets; engineering and economics in isolation is not enough to capture the complex interaction.
APPENDIX PROOF OF THEOREM 1
In computing , the optimization is an LP linearly parameterized by . Then it is well-known that the optimal objective function (in this case ) is continuous and piecewise linear in the parameter , e.g., see [46, Lemma 2] . Thus, is a continuous and piecewise linear function of . For , the feasible set for the optimization problem to compute is a subset of that of and thus is non-decreasing in . Let the optimal points for problems and be and , respectively. For any , the point is a feasible point for the problem . Then it follows that is concave.
Next, we show that and are inverses of each other. For any , consider the optimal point for the optimization problem to compute . This optimum is feasible for the optimization problem and we have (11) Similarly, it can be checked that for any (12) For , replacing in (12), we obtain (13) Now, for , we have is concave and non-decreasing. Then it is easy to check that is monotonically increasing in this interval and hence from (13) , it follows that Combining the above relation with (11), we have (14) The rest follows from the fact that for , the map is monotonically increasing and hence one-one in this interval.
